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I. Introduction
One of the distinctive characteristics of China's socialist economy from as early
as the 1950s has been its decentralised administrative and economic structure
(Riskin, 1987; Granick, 1990). Followingly, in contrast to the top-down process
of economic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, largely orchestrated by a
small number of newly elected liberal politicians and their Western economic
advisers, reforms in China have proceeded in a decentralised and incremental
fashion (Fan, 1994; Ma, 1994). It was a conscious strategy of China's leader
Deng Xiaoping to let the more advanced coastal regions "grow rich first" and
use the resources thus mobilised as an engine of modernisation in the
underdeveloped interior. By the early 1990s, the process of decentralisation had
transferred over 80 per cent of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to the
hands of local governments at the provincial, country and municipal level.
Moreover, local governments retained over 60 per cent of national fiscal
revenues and, via their control over the local branches of China's state-owned
commercial banks, critically influenced the allocation of investment (Ma, 1994).
The extent of China's decentralisation, particularly in the area of resource
mobilisation and allocation, has given new flavour to an old debate about the
economic benefits of China's fragmented administrative structure (Dennithorne,
1972; Lardy, 1978). While most observers would agree that ultimately the
decentralisation of decision making from central government officials to
independent market participants is an essential component of even a "socialist
market economy", the current intermediate stage where local governments retain
substantial discretion is viewed by some as a hindrance rather than a help in the
structural change of the Chinese economy (Wong, 1988; Ma, 1994). Thus, it is
argued that as local rates of return diverge from shadow prices at the national
level, resources are misallocated and the central government comes to bear an
increasing burden of national development expenditures while foregoing a
growing share of tax revenue. In consequence, not only are structural distortions
This paper was written for the project "The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in System
Transformation: Lessons from China for Central Eastern Europe?". Financial support from
the VW-Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Special thanks are due to Peter
Nunnenkamp and Rolf Langhammer for insightful comments on earlier drafts and to
Michaela Rank for diligent and efficient research assistance.preserved or even exacerbated but national resource mobilisation increasingly
has to rely on the inflation tax. Against this pessimistic view, others have
highlighted the impressive success of enterprises under lower level governments
in China, the township and village enterprises (TVEs) in particular (Byrd and
Lin, 1990; Yusuf, 1994) and argued that fiscal decentralisation and increased
autonomy at the local government level were instrumental in bringing about the
success of industrial reforms in China (Granick, 1990). This view contends that
budget constraints on local governments are typically much harder than on the
central government, because local governments do not have independent access
to seignorage. Moreover, competition for mobile national capital creates strong
incentives for local governments to create a hospitable investment environment,
for instance by expanding local infrastructure. Hence the opportunity cost of
using local fiscal revenues to subsidise loss-makers is high once central
investment grants are phased out. As a result, the incentives at the local level to
encourage profit maximisation by SOEs are large (Qiang and Roland, 1994).
1
One means at the disposition of local governments is, of course, to increase the
autonomy and profit retention rights of "their" SOEs (see e.g. Groves et al.,
1994), thereby voluntarily foregoing their discretionary rights.
This paper argues that the above sketched debate may largely be understood in
terms of a fundamental inconsistency in China's economic reform process: while
fiscal decentralisation may have hardened budget constraints for state-owned
enterprises, the accompanying process of monetary decentralisation has
counteracted such positive incentive effects (Ma, 1994). Thus the central
government has been acutely aware of the potential for invigorating the
economy through the promotion of local initiative. Fiscal decentralisation has
been the means by which this potential has traditionally been tapped in China
(Riskin, 1987; Naughton, 1986). On the other hand, Beijing has never resigned
its control over resource allocation completely. As the central government's
ability to tax high profit sectors was reduced, the credit plan has become the
major vehicle for the realisation of national development aims. In consequence,
the burden of previous fiscal subsidies has shifted to the banking system, driving
the quasi fiscal deficit up to an estimated 7-9 per cent of GDP by 1993 (World
^Bank, 1994a). Moreover, because of their influence over the local branches of
China's state banks, local governments have progressively gained control over
monetary policy too, without concurrent responsibilities for macro-economic
1 An interesting parallel seems to be emerging in Russia, where some oblasts like Nishni
Novogorod are spearheading the reform process, largely in view of increasing local
government revenues (see "Moskau ist weit", Die Zeit, 4 May, 1995).management (Herrmann-Pillath, 1991). The opportunity costs of bank funds are
thus substantially lower than of fiscal revenues and a misallocation of resources
is likely. The consequences in recent times have been growing inflationary
pressure and significant doubts over the true incentives facing China's SOEs and
their resulting economic performance (e.g. Woo et al., 1994).
Dynamic growth and growing macroeconomic instability are thus intertwined in
China's decentralised economic reforms. Which of the two will prevail is largely
an empirical matter. Fortunately, the regionally differentiated impact of China's
economic reforms allows one to test for the consequences of reforms
inconsistency on the micro-economic behaviour of enterprises and thus to gauge
whether budget constraints have been hardened or softened in the course of
reform. This paper takes a first attempt in this direction. Using enterprise survey
data from four coastal cities in China, we show that industrial total factor
productivity has grown more rapidly in those cities which have accorded higher
autonomy to the enterprises under their jurisdiction. Not surprisingly, these cities
are located in Guangdong and Fujian provinces which have in turn had the
highest fiscal autonomy since the beginning of reforms (Ferdinand, 1989; Wu,
1993). In a second step, we investigate the determinants of the allocation of
financial funds, among the sampled enterprises. Dividing these funds according
to their sources yields the remarkable finding that allocative inefficiencies are
greatest in the distribution of bank loans for investment and working capital.
Moreover, enterprise autonomy improves capital allocation and is related to a
pattern of investment demand at the enterprise level consistent with profit
maximisation. These results exemplify the mentioned inconsistency in China's
decentralised reforms and raise the hypothesis that resource allocation is least
efficient in those areas, such as the Western and Northern provinces where only
little autonomy has been granted to enterprises so far and investment depends
largely on resources provided under the credit plan. This contention cannot be
proved with our micro-economic data and is left for further investigation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II documents the
process of fiscal decentralisation, price liberalisation and the shifts in investment
financing since the beginning of economic reforms. Section El presents the
estimates of total factor and labour productivity growth in our enterprise survey
and relates them to qualitative data on regional and enterprise autonomy. Section
IV turns to the determinants of financial resource allocation and Section V
concludes.II. The Emergence of Dukedoms: The impact of decentralised reforms in
China
Since the end of the first five year plan and the break with the Soviet Union in
1958, China has seen several episodes of decentralisation. Interestingly, while
the motivation behind such developments before 1978 was largely political and
dictated by Mao's distaste for national bureaucracies, the instruments of
decentralisation were the same during the pre-reform and reform periods.
Already in the 1950s, local governments were made responsible for part of
investment financing in SOEs under their jurisdictional control and gained
retention rights over the enterprises' depreciation funds (Granick, 1990). In 1970,
local revenue retention was further increased and 30 per cent of fixed capital
investment put under local government control (Riskin, 1987, p. 217). "Non-
budgetary" investment in fixed capital formation, including depreciation funds
and all retained earnings by local governments and enterprises themselves,
increased from 16 per cent in 1966 to 35 per cent in 1975 and in 1981 exceeded
central budgetary investment for the first time (Naughton, 1986). It is arguable
that such early reforms left local governments with substantial experience in
managing SOEs and may have introduced de facto property rights of
government officials in public enterprises at the local level (Granick, 1990).
Nonetheless, before 1978 the central government continued to interfere with
local government decisions and most profit tax revenues had to be transferred to
the central budget (Ferdinand, 1989). This changed decisively with the
introduction of revenue sharing contracts in the late 1970s. These contracts have
seen substantial alterations over time and have typically been negotiated
individually for each province (Agarwala, 1992). Their principle, however, is
simple. The central government fixes a share of current revenue in nominal
terms and establishes a constant rate of increase over a fixed number of years.
All or most excess revenue accruing to the provincial government may be
retained by the latter. Regional differentiation is introduced by the percentage
share that is originally retained at the province. Table 1 shows how this system
has led to an increasing share of fiscal revenues at the disposition of provincial
governments.
2 Note that this is expressed as a decrease in the difference between
2 These in turn were free to pass on their retention rights to sub-provincial levels of
administration. Particularly favourable conditions were established in the special economic
zones (see IMF, 1993) but occasionally also other municipalities.Table 1 — Differences Between Revenues and Expenditures of Chinese Provinces as
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Source: Ferdinand (1989), p. 45; Ma (1994), p. 25.local expenditures and revenues as a share of total revenues collected at the
province. The higher are local expenditures, the higher are retention rights. The
regional pattern of autonomy in Table 1 follows the fiscal significance of a
particular province for the central government. In general, by 1978 the Southern
coastal provinces contributed to or gained little from the central government
budget. They were thus granted autonomy earliest and most extensively. At the
other end of the spectrum are the three municipalities of Shanghai, Beijing, and
Tianjin and traditionally rich coastal provinces, in particular the old industrial
heartland of Lianoning. Here fiscal autonomy has been granted far more
gradually. Finally, the provinces along China's Western border have remained
substantially dependent on net subsidies, the burden of which has progressively
shifted to central outlays.
3
It may be useful to spell out again the incentives embedded in this system of
fiscal decentralisation. Clearly, the higher the marginal retention rate at the
provincial level, the higher the incentives to maximise revenue collection. This
can be done either by maximising profits in existing enterprises or investing in
new, more profitable activities. In the first case, there may be a contradiction in
the short run between enhancing managerial and worker effort by raising
incomes and extracting a high profit tax. However, most empirical studies for
the 1980s including the present one (see section in) show a clear link between
managerial and worker incentives (e.g. profit retention and bonus payments) and
enterprise efficiency (Groves et a., 1994; Hay et al., 1994; Raiser, 1995). It is
likely that local governments have over time come to realise this connection and
have passed on their autonomy to SOEs and collective enterprises under their
jurisdiction. Although there was nothing in the fiscal contracts demanding such
an outcome, it has arguably been one of the central forces behind both the
reform of state-enterprises and the dynamism of the non-state, collective sector
(Yusuf, 1994). From this perspective, fiscal decentralisation creates positive
incentives for improving enterprise performance.
4
The second means to maximise revenue, namely new investments in profitable
activities, has caused much concern during the late 1980s in the context of local
protectionism (Wong, 1988). Price distortions led to the multiplication of
productive capacity across regions and the erections of trade barriers, arguably
3 The data in Table 1 are not fully consistent between 1991 and earlier years. According to
Ma (1994), fiscal subsidies to the interior have fallen dramatically since 1983. Nonetheless
they were still high in 1991 according to his figures given in the table.
4 See Qiang and Roland (1994) for a formal model.further exacerbating China's domestic market fragmentation (World Bank,
1994b). As Su (1992) shows, regional industrial structures in China have tended
to converge over the 1980s, contradicting the expected pattern of regional
specialisation following comparative advantage.
5 The emergence of "dukedoms"
was thus seen by many as presenting the biggest obstacle against the necessary
structural change (Rothenberg, 1987). Against this view, we argue that the
substantial liberalisation of prices achieved by 1992 (Table 2) has greatly
improved the integration of China's national goods market and served to reduce
inherited distortions.
6 More importantly, the dynamic development of township
and village enterprises has created an alternative source of fiscal revenues and
introduced competition for limited budgetary outlays (Yusuf, 1994). In some
coastal provinces such as Zheijiang, TVEs are by now so important to the local
budget that fiscal support has shifted away from the traditional SOE sectors to
non-state enterprises, including TVEs.
7 In a sense thus, here again incentives
have gone in the direction of enhancing competition and improving enterprise
performance, at least in those regions where a basis for non-state led growth
already existed (see also Jefferson and Rawski, 1994).
8
In our view, the major element of decentralised reform contradicting the positive
incentives emanating from fiscal decentralisation lies in the effective
decentralisation of monetary policy. The second largest component of
investment after retained earnings since the mid-1980s has been the provision of
long-term bank loans through China's state-owned banking system. As Table 3
reveals, by the early 1990s, bank loans had replaced most central budgetary
investment grants. This substitution followed the principle that depreciation
funds and locally retained profits should be used for repairs and replacement of
5 As the World Bank (1994b) points out, regional specialisation and interregional trade
would be expected from the unequal distribution of natural resources but, apart from local
protectionism, is also significantly hindered by high transport costs.
6 Indeed, since 1992 further liberalisation has eliminated price controls on agricultural
products in many provinces. Planned energy prices have also been raised substantially.
7 In 1992, collectively owned enterprises (COEs) and TVEs together in this province
accounted for 62 per cent of industrial output against 26 per cent for SOEs (SSB, 1993).
8 It is also important to remember that most Chinese provinces are comparable to European
countries in size and population. On the other hand transport costs are still extremely high.
There is thus substantial scope for developing regional economies.Table 2 — Price Liberalisation in China 1978-92;









































































Source: IMF (1993), p. 27; World Bank (1994b), p. 34.
Table 3 — The Financing of Fixed Asset Investment of State-Owned Enterprises,
1985-1991
Sources

























Source: IMF (1993), p. 12.the current capital stock and the provision of welfare services for employees
(including bonus payments), while the banking system would take over the role
of financing new capital construction and providing short term liquidity to SOEs
(Sicular, 1992). For the central government this subdivision was important as it
allowed it to retain national control over the volume and direction of investment,
by constraining bank lending under the credit plan.
In practise, the single instrument of the credit plan proved far too weak to ensure
the realisation of Beijing's structural and industrial policies, while maintaining
macro-economic stability at the same time (Bowles and White, 1993). As
investment loans in particular were typically provided at negative real interest
rates, rent-seeking by local governments was prone to become a serious
problem.
9 In addition, funds were fungible between intended uses and the central
bank repeatedly had to make up for leakages by providing additional credit
quotas if investment targets were to be fulfilled. Institutionally, the structure of
China's monetary system ensured that local governments would gain substantial
control over the credit plan both at the formulation and implementation stage
(Agarwala, 1992; Ma, 1994). China's central bank has a local branch in every
province and often even below at the county level. Government officials
significantly interfere in personnel decisions in these branches, leading to
divided loyalties of local bankers. Table 4 reveals how, in response to local
government lobbying, during inflationary episodes actual credit expansion has
widely exceeded projections under the credit plan. Lack of expertise merely
exacerbated the problems of capital misallocation.












































Source: Ma (1994), p. 46; IMF (1993), p. 7.
9 For an estimate of the total weight of interest rate subsidies in the national economy see
Perkins and Raiser (1994).10
The foregoing discussion suggests that there might be an empirical difference at
the enterprise level between the use of funds provided through retained earnings
or local budgets and funds provided by the state-owned banking system,
reflecting the fact that the opportunity costs of the latter are perceived to be
substantially lower. Further, where autonomy over investment is delegated to the
enterprises, the allocation of financial funds overall should improve. In
particular, competition from non-state enterprises raises the costs of
misallocating resources and spending effort on rent-seeking in the bureaucratic
market (Scott, 1990). Non-state firms could also compete for financial resources
in the capital market directly or offer an outlet for re-lending credit quotas at
higher rates of interest. Thus, those provinces benefiting from a high degree of
fiscal autonomy may also suffer less from the distortions in capital markets if
they use their authority to delegate management responsibilities to the enterprise
level and encourage the growth of non-state enterprises.
In sum, China's decentralised reforms have created incentives for revenue
maximisation at the local government level which may have translated into
profit maximising behaviour at the enterprise level, whereby the local
government acts as the effective principal of the SOEs under its jurisdiction. At
the same time, however, decentralisation has also led to a loss of monetary
control as local government rent-seeking has effectively emasculated the
allocative role of the credit plan. Which of the two effects has been dominant is
an empirical matter. The following section investigates whether increased
enterprise autonomy has led to improved economic performance. Thereby, we
contend that enterprise autonomy is a direct consequence of the process of fiscal
decentralisation. The subsequent section turns to the issue of capital allocation.
III. Autonomy and Efficiency in Chinese Enterprises
In the neoclassical theory of the firm, an optimal allocation of factor inputs is
achieved by postulating the goal of profit maximisation. This goal is to drive
decision making by enterprise managers. Under state ownership and restricted
manager autonomy, other goals may come to interfere with profit maximisation
and distort the allocation of resources. We follow the thrust of the recent
literature on enterprise reform in transition economies in consequently
hypothesising a positive link between increased management autonomy and
enterprise performance.
The data used in this and the subsequent section are from a survey of 300
enterprises in the 4 cities of Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Xiamen and Shanghai11
conducted in 1993.
1
0 Of these four cities, Guangzhou and Shenzhen lie in
Guangdong province, the area that has spearheaded the reform process in the
1980s. Shenzhen and Xiamen are also special economic zones and therefore are
expected to have granted higher autonomy to their enterprises. As mentioned
above, Shanghai has received less autonomy recently. The survey includes
enterprises in various ownership forms; SOEs, COEs, TVEs, joint ventures
(JVs) and wholly foreign owned firms (WFOs) and six industrial sub-sectors;
garments, textiles, electrical appliances, machine tools, iron and steel and heavy
metal products. Enterprise managers were asked quantitative questions about the
firm's production, inputs, costs, and financing for the years 1980, 1982, and
1984 through 1992. For most of our analysis, we only use data for the five years
of 1980, 1985 and 1990-1992. In addition, managers completed a qualitative
questionnaire asking about their current (1992) level of autonomy and perceived
causes of economic difficulties. This section uses these qualitative data for 183
of these firms to characterise their operating environment in the four different
locations and study their relative economic performance. In this sense, it is a
sequel to Raiser (1995), where ownership differences were used as a criteria for
analysing enterprise performance.
The distribution of enterprises by sector and ownership in the four cities in
shown in Table 5. We can see that the garments sector has by far the largest
weight in our sample. Shenzhen stands out for having a significantly larger
proportion of electrical appliances firms which recorded the highest output and
total factor productivity growth in our sample (see Perkins and Zheng, 1994).
Apart from that, however, the sub-sectoral distribution is relatively equal across
locations. With respect to ownership, the differences are more pronounced.
Shenzhen arid Xiamen, the two special economic zones, host most of the JVs
and WFOs. This introduces a bias as these firms have been reportedly
outperforming domestic enterprises (Perkins and Zheng, 1994). Because of the
small sample sizes we cannot control for this factor and suggest to concentrate
on matching enterprise performance in Guangzhou to that in Shanghai and
comparing Shenzhen to Xiamen.
1
0 I am grateful to Dr. Frances Perkins of the Australian National University for allowing me
to use their data.12



































































The first task is to contrast enterprise autonomy in the four cities. This is done in
Table 6 which shows the distribution of decision making authority in several
fields crucial to enterprise management across locations. It emerges quite clearly
from Table 6 that enterprises in Shanghai have been subject to a higher degree of
government intervention (expressed by a high proportion of decisions made
either jointly by supervisory authorities and the firm or by the former alone).
These restrictions are most important in the area of investment decisions but also
significant in exports and pricing of products produced outside the plan.
Guangzhou firms also face substantial intervention in investment decisions,
exports and the labour market. Interestingly, Xiamen enterprises report much
higher restrictions on investment than their counterparts in Shenzhen and also
seem to be less autonomous in the labour market. The overall pattern in Table 6
confirms to the general development sketched in the previous section. In line
with the tighter degree of central government control on the local economy,
Shanghai authorities have been more reluctant to pass on autonomy to the
enterprises under their jurisdiction.13
Table 6 — Autonomy and Location in 1992: percentage dis
decision making authority
a




































































































































































































































































































































































A first indication of the impact that different degrees of autonomy may have had
on enterprise performance can be glanced from Table 7. Asked for the three
major reasons why their enterprises had experienced declining profitability in
the past years, managers in Shanghai quoted price restrictions more than three
times as much as managers in the other three cities. Interestingly, Shanghai
enterprises do not report to have been restricted in their access to investment
funds and seem to have suffered less from changes in market demand and
structure. This is indicative of preferential treatment under the credit plan and a
lesser degree of market competition. As a consequence of these qualitative
results, we would henceforth expect enterprise performance in Shanghai to be
worse than in the other locations. The differences in autonomy between Xiamen
and Shenzhen are also confirmed by Table 7 and would indicate diverging
performance in these two special economic zones.15
Table 7 — Reasons given by Enterprises for Decline in Profits
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Source: Sample survey data, own calculations.
The main indicator we use to estimate enterprise performance is total factor






real net value of output
number of workers
real value of fixed capital.
Measured in this way, TFP indicates the level of output that can be achieved
with a given level of inputs. It is equivalent to Farell's (1957) well known
1
1 See Perkins and Zheng (1994) for a similar application and Morrison (1993) for a survey
of micro-economic productivity measures.16
concept of output based efficiency. A higher level of TFP indicates either a
technical superiority or a better allocation of resources. Here we posit that
economic reforms have led to an increase in TFP, primarily by improving the
allocation of resources rather than by pure technical upgrading. Note that we use
1990 as our base year, as around half of all enterprises only came into existence
after 1985 or refused to supply data for earlier years. One implication is that TFP
growth estimates for the period 1980 to 1990 are significantly affected by only a
small number of firms, particularly in the case of Shenzhen and Xiamen. The
available literature on the economic performance of these four locations does,
however, broadly confirm the direction of the results presented below.
1
2
Assuming perfect competition, the weights used to calculate the efficiency
residual in equation 1) are equal to the factor shares. However, in line with
previous studies we prefer to estimate the implicit factor shares from a Cobb
Douglas production function directly. This was run for the case of two factor
inputs and the net value of output as the measure of production. A three input
specification was rejected on two main grounds. First, estimated factor shares
may be biased due to the high correlation of material and capital inputs. Second,
the available material price deflators have been questioned and shown to
significantly affect estimates of total factor productivity growth in Chinese
industry (Woo et al., 1994). While the exclusion of materials may lead to a
downward bias in our estimates (see Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng, 1992), it
should not affect the results of our cross-locational comparison. Tests for
constant returns to scale were conducted on the cross-sectional data for all years
and failed to reject the restriction that the factor elasticities sum to unity. Chow-
tests also indicated that data could be pooled over the five years 1980, 1985 and
1990-92. Finally, a more general translog specification did not yield significant
higher order terms and could thus be disregarded (see also Raiser, 1995). The




2 For a comparison of the performance of special economic zones see IMF (1993) and
Spinanger (1994). On cross-provincial growth comparisons see Hsueh, Rawski and Tsui
(1993).
1
3 Several tests were conducted to establish the robustness of this result. Estimates using
current prices and 1992 data yielded an alpha of 0.67. When the capital stock was
endogenised in a seperate investment demand equation (see Morris and Liu, 1994;
Murakami, Liu and Otsuka, 1994), the estimate for alpha dropped somewhat to 0.57.
Nonetheless, these results suggest that the weights we use are in a realistic range. In Raiser
(1995) we also compute output elasticities for four of the six industrial sub-sectors17
2) Ing,., =Const.+OJl]nLit+0.29lnKit+eDt,
where Dt are year dummies and "e" is a vector of efficiency parameters
not reported here.
Table 8 presents total factor productivity indices for the four cities. The
hypothesis of worsening economic performance in Shanghai is strongly
confirmed, as indeed total factor productivity declined by almost one half
between 1985 and 1990 in this city. Guangzhou and Xiamen also experienced a
decline in efficiency, reflecting primarily the fact that 1985 was a peak year
while 1990 was a trough in the substantial amplitude of the Chinese business
cycle.
1
4 In the following recovery, Shanghai recorded a growth of total factor
productivity of 13 per cent against 34 per cent in Guangzhou and 51 per cent in
Shenzhen. The worsening economic performance of Shanghai also stands out as
being far more significant than differences across ownership categories. Table 9
displays total factor productivity indices for the five different ownership types.
While SOEs clearly grew slowest, COEs performed not much better. Moreover,
sirtce 1990, average productivity growth of SOEs and non-state firms was
virtually the same. Hence, even controlling for differences in ownership
distribution, Shanghai experienced a substantially worse growth performance.
1
5
































seperately. The direction of the results in this paper are not affected by the use of seperate
sectoral weights.
1
4 See Lau and Brada (1990) for the effects of cyclical fluctuations on measured industrial
efficiency in China. •
^ This result was finally checked by calculating TFP growth for SOEs and COEs only in all
four cities. The small sample sizes make interpretation difficult but the general trend of
declining TFP in Shanghai against growth in Guangzhou is confirmed.18













































It is important to note that lower productivity growth in Shanghai has not yet led
to lower absolute levels of efficiency.
1
6 Rather, the older and more capital
intensive industrial structure in Shanghai has come under increasing competitive
pressure from the Southern coastal provinces. Hsue, Rawski and Tsui (1993)
also find negative total factor productivity growth (minus 1 per cent per annum)
for Shanghai in the period of 1980 to 1989, in contrast to a cross-provincial
average of roughly 1 plus 2 per cent. Arguably in response to such
developments, Shanghai has received reform priority since 1992. Unfortunately,
our data do not extend far enough to check for significant changes in the
operating environment and economic performance of the Shanghai firms.
Finally, the disappointing performance of Xiamen confirms the hypothesised
link between autonomy and performance, particularly when compared to
Shenzhen. This result is borne out by an IMF (1993, p.34) study which finds that
average industrial output growth in Xiamen was lowest among the four original
special economic zones. It is also indicative of the fact that not all special
economic zones have yielded net benefits to China (see Spinanger, 1994).
We now further investigate the relationship between autonomy and performance
by introducing autonomy and incentive variables directly into the production
1
6 This can easily be checked by introducing location dummies in a cross-sectional estimation
of the production function for 1992. The following results confirm that growth
differentials have narrowed an existing productivity gap over time:
= -0.41+0.24 In K + 0.76 In L + 0.50LOCI - 0.49LOC2+0.13L0C3,
whereby Guangzhou was chosen as a base and LOCl=Shenzhen, L0C2=Xiamen,
L0C3=Shanghai.19
function. For this purpose, we rewrite the Cobb-Douglas production function in
terms of production per capita and pool data across all four cities from 1985 to
1992. We also allow for fixed technological effects by introducing intercept
dummies for five industrial sub-sectors. Autonomy and incentive variables are




where P is the output elasticity of capital, a and 8 are parameters to be
estimated, Dj is the vector of sub-sector dummies, \x jt is an error term,
and i and t are individual and time subscripts respectively.
In choosing the variables representing the vector Xjt, we face the problem that
the qualitative survey data presented above applies only to the year 1992 and
cannot be used to predict the impact that a change in autonomy has on the
performance of a specific firm. In the case that autonomy was granted primarily
to firms that had already proven to be successful, we would be facing a problem
of reverse causality. Fortunately, the qualitative questionnaire also asked for the
specific management form of enterprises in each year of the survey. We can thus
identify firms that have changed from one regime to another and test for the
effects this had on their performance. The following five forms were
distinguished: share-holding, contract responsibility system, leasing, director
responsibility system and asset management. Of these five forms, the contract
responsibility and director responsibility systems were dominant among SOEs
during the mid-1980s.
1
8 Although both forms clearly did increase profit
incentives of managers, it is generally acknowledged that the room left for
discretionary intervention by supervisory authorities remained large (e.g. Hay et
al., 1994). By contrast, firms practising any of the other three management forms
are expected to have higher degrees of autonomy. Table 10 verifies the link
1
7 Equation 3) is estimated by OLS. The unbalanced structure of the panel data makes this
preferrable to specifying a fixed or random effects model. The results are, however, robust
to panel estimation. As Greene (1993) points out, OLS leads to unbiased estimates of all
coefficients, although it does not allow one to retrieve individual firm effects.
1
8 The director responsibility system allowed the firm manager to decide about the use of a
proportion of above quota profit and linked his remuneration to enterprise performance. In
the contract responsibility system, these incentives were formalised in a fixed contract
resembling the tax sharing contract between the central and provincial governments
discussed above. In our sample the proportion of firms under the director responsibility
system declined from 80.5 per cent in 1985 to 57.3 per cent in 1992. The share of firms on
the contract responsibility system increased from 6 per cent in 1985 to 14 per cent in 1992,
while the proportion of firms operating any of the other three management systems
increased from 13.6 per cent in 1985 to 28.7 per cent in 1992.20
between management forms and autonomy for the year 1992, putting all firms
on share-holding, leasing and asset management responsibility systems into one
group (DMA3). DMA1 represents the director responsibility system and DMA2
contract responsibility. The results of Table 10 show that DMA3 firms are far
less restricted in their management decision than DMA1 firms. DMA2 firms are
also somewhat more autonomous. We would therefore expect DMA3 firms to
display higher economic efficiency.
Additional variables included in the vector X-lt are the share of profit retained by
the enterprise (PROPRE) and the share of bonuses in the total wage bill (STW).
These variables have been used extensively in the literature on enterprise
performance in China (Chetty, Ratha and Singh, 1994; Groves et al., 1994; Hay
etal., 1994; Raiser, 1995) and need no further elaboration. It is hypothesised that
the higher the share of profits retained, the higher the incentives to improve
productive efficiency and the higher bonus payments, the higher workers' effort.
Both variables should thus be signed positively. In the final specification, all
three components of Xft were instrumented by their one year lags to overcome
the obvious problem of two way causation.
The results in Table 11 reveal that a high degree of autonomy through share-
holding leasing and asset management (DMA3) has a weakly significant
positive impact on labour productivity. However, this result only holds for the
case of excluding PROPRE which substantially increases the number of
observations. PROPRE itself is insignificant, a result that contradicts findings by
other authors. In our case, it may be due to underreporting of profits for purposes
of tax evasion (Perkins and Zheng, 1994). The differences between enterprises
in the other two management groups are not significant. It would seem from this
result that the substantial locational differences identified above go beyond
difference in the management form. One of these differences clearly is the
degree of competition. The most significant contribution to labour productivity
emanates from worker bonuses. Every increase in the share of bonuses in total
wages by one percentage point, increases labour productivity by almost 0.75 per
cent. There is very strong indication from our sample that Chinese enterprises
had substantial scope for increasing the productivity of their workers merely by
improving shop floor morale.21
Table 10 — Autonomy by DMA Dummies - Share of Enterprises Where Decisions











































































































































































































































































































































IV. Autonomy and Investment Allocation
Although the previous section has found strong support for a positive association
between autonomy and improved enterprise performance, this link may be
broken by a softening of budget constraints in the capital market. As noted
above, the decentralisation of China's monetary system may counteract the
beneficial effects of fiscal decentralisation on resource allocation. Only if
enterprise autonomy is also related to improvements in the use of outside
financial resources can decentralisation be said to have been fully effective in
raising the efficiency of Chinese enterprises. This section proceeds to an
analysis of capital allocation among the enterprises in our sample. We first seek
to identify differences in the distribution of bank credit and other financial funds.
We also investigate whether such differences may be related to the locational
differences in total factor productivity growth and autonomy identified above.
Then, we analyse the impact of autonomy on the distribution of financial funds.
Finally, we specify and estimate a neo-classical investment function to
determine behavioural differences according to the degree of autonomy.
In the quantitative questionnaire, enterprises were asked about the total value of
investment funds (TINVS), working capital funds (WKQ) and the value of
investment financed through bank credit (CINV). Subtracting CINV from
TINVS one obtains the value of investment funds provided by retained earnings,
budgetary grants and in JVs and WFOs from foreign direct investment
(NCINV). Unfortunately, a further subdivision was not possible. All four
variables were divided by the gross value of output and form our set of
dependent variables. As determinants of capital allocation the following
variables were selected;
- PROM, the profit margin, computed as gross profit over gross value of output.
We use this variable as an indicator of creditworthiness in which case it should
positively influence the allocation of investment funds (see also Pinto and v.
Wijnbergen, 1994). While it may be argued that retained earnings may serve as a
substitute for outside investment finance, they only become available in the next
period. Hence, a negative relationship of PROM to any of the financial funds
variables is likely to indicate perverse credit allocation.
1
9
- STOCKS, the ratio of output inventories to the gross value of output. Under
efficiency criteria, this variable should not be associated with the provision of
1
9 As retained profits are included in NCINV this introduces a bias into the correlation.
However, depreciation funds are a much larger proportion of retained earnings and too few
firms reported separate data to subtract retained profits from the NCINV series.24
investment funds. In the same vein, there should also not be a positive
association to working capital funds, even if individual firms use working capital
to bridge a liquidity gap. If such a positive association can be established this is
evidence that banks are keeping inefficient enterprises afloat.
- ALEFF, a variable capturing allocative inefficiency, calculated as difference
between the output elasticity of labour (alpha = 0.71) and the share of total
labour incomes in the net value of output. ALEFF will be negative in the case of
overemployment or excess worker remuneration. Hence, if its coefficient in any
of the three regressions is negative, this indicate the use of outside finance by
enterprises to prevent employment restructuring.
Each of the four dependent variables was regressed against all three regressors, a
constant and a dummy for SOEs using first differences and pooling data from
1985-1992. The SOE dummy is expected to be positively signed if SOEs had
preferential access to financial funds. Table 12 reports the results for all four
locations. The most interesting finding is that there are clear differences in the
results for CINV and NCINV. For instance, in Guangzhou, there is a significant
negative relationship between PROM and CINV but a positive association in the
case of NCINV. In Xiamen, the coefficient on PROM and STOCKS change
their sign, becoming significantly positive and negative respectively in the
NCINV equation while being insignificant for CINV. Only in Shanghai there is
little evidence that non-bank credit is allocated more efficiently. Note, however,
that the small number of observations makes interpretation difficult in the latter
case.
Turning.to some locational differences, STOCKS in Shanghai have a significant
positive impact on total investment funds and working capital allocations. The
share of working capital in total output is also higher in those Shanghai firms
suffering from allocative inefficiency. This is clear indication that both directed
credit and budgetary resources are used to prop up ailing enterprises in this city.
In Xiamen, working capital funds are also positively associated with STOCKS,
confirming the concerns about the operating environment in this location. Such
concerns are further supported by the high and significantly negative coefficient
on ALEFF in the total investment fund equation for Xiamen. A labour share 10
percentage points above 0.71 triggers additional investment funds in the order of
5.7 per cent of gross output value in this city.25
Table 12 — Allocation of Financial Funds by Location
a
Dependent Variable







































































































































































































































a T-statistics in parentheses.26
We do not want to interpret too much into these results. The fit of the estimated
regressions is generally poor and the differences between the locations is overall
rather small. Table 12 mainly serves to show that the allocation of bank credit
has been dominated in all four cities by non-market forces. What locational
pattern there is does not contradict the view of higher distortions in those cities
where less autonomy has been granted but the evidence is clearly too weak to
draw firm conclusions.


























































































































One reason for the small locational differences may lie in the fact that
investment was the one area where enterprises were rather strongly restricted in
all four cities (Table 6). If autonomy is the crucial variable in determining
capital allocation, subdividing our sample by the degree of autonomy in
investment decisions as reported in Table 6 might yield more easily interpretable
results. Hence, we reran the set of regression for two subgroups, namely all
firms where investment decisions were made jointly with supervisory authorities
or by the latter alone (D1NV23), and all other firms (DAINV). Table 13
confirms our expectation that a subdivision by autonomy yields much clearer
differences between subgroups. Interestingly, this is the case particularly for27
TINVS, NCINV, and WKQ but less for CINV. This again stresses the
deficiencies in China's banking system. For enterprises in the DAINV subgroup,
total financial funds, non-bank funds and working capital are positively
associated with profitability, unrelated to inventories and allocative inefficiency
and do not respond to ownership differences. By contrast, in DINV23 firms
investment funds go primarily to firms struggling with overemployment or
excessive wage bills, while working capital funds are used to finance
stockbuilding. Surprisingly, as in Table 12, there is little evidence for
preferential treatment for SOEs.
On the basis of the above results, we can conclude that government interventions
restricting enterprise investment autonomy are one of the main reasons for the
inefficient allocation of capital in China. In this sense, the results reflect the
priorities of capital suppliers. A different angle to the same question is provided
by an analysis of capital demand at the enterprise level. As Kornai (1980)
argues, enterprises with soft budget constraints display an unsatiable investment
hunger, unconstrained by interest rates or negative supply shocks. An analysis of
investment demand, therefore, may help to clarify whether monetary
decentralisation has been sufficient to offset the hardening of budget constraints
provided for by fiscal decentralisation. Following Morris and Liu (1994), we
derive an investment demand equation from the first order condition of profit
maximisation:
4) K;, = pQ^, where
Cu
K*t = desired optimal capital stock
Qll = real net value of output
P = output elasticity of capital
Pjt = price index for output, different for each sector
C\t = user cost of capital.
The effective user cost of capital is defined as:
5) C,=/>fj^-^'^,\ where
P£ = price index for capital goods for each sector (see Zheng, 1994)
rit = effective interest rate, calculated as total interest paid/value of
bank loans outstanding
dlt - depreciation rate, calculated as total depreciation/nominal value of
fixed capital stock28
tj = profit tax rate, calculated as the value of tax payments/gross profit
for each firm averaged over the 1985-1992 period.
2
0
F = retained profits (PROPRE)
y , a j,a 2
 = parameters to be estimated.
Equation 5) provides a general formulation, allowing for different elasticities of
capital costs w.r.t. profit taxes and the interest rate and introducing the
availability of internal investment funds (e.g. retained earnings) as a determinant
of the user cost. The idea is that if there is an external finance constraint, then
the availability of internal funds should lower the effective cost of investment. In
market economies where capital is substitutable between different sources, we
should obtain an estimate of X insignificantly different from zero. In China, a
negative value for X is expected because capital markets are segmented. An
estimate of X equal to zero in this case would indicate preferential access to
credit markets. Finally, equation 5) includes a relative price of capital goods. In
the estimation presented below, this is captured as the ratio of the investment
goods deflator to the output price deflator for each of the six sub-sectors in our
sample. Substituting 5) into 4) we get:
6) K = pc
where bj and 0*2 are the elasticities of the desired capital stock with
respect to the real net value of output and the real user cost of capital.
Equation 6) gives the desired optimal capital stock in each period. However, it
may be more realistic to assume a partial adjustment of the capital stock to the
desired level, reflecting adjustment costs and administrative interventions that
may overshadow the profit maximisation goal of the enterprise. Thus, for
estimation purposes, we adopt the following dynamic formulation from Morris
and Liu (1994):
7) pK
S2 In—J!±-S2ox[rit_x +di,_1]+82<J2[l-ti]-d2*Fil_1 +nit,
rj<-i
I(t - real value of gross fixed capital investment, u. lt - error term.
2
0 Such averaging was necessary as the year-on-year volatility of effective tax rates is
extremely high. As explained below our interest is in the cross sectional variation of tax
rates.29
It is, of course, arguable whether investment demand in Chinese enterprises is
really a function of a profit maximisation goal. The extent to which equation 7)
provides a satisfactory description of investment demand in the various
subsamples we have used in this paper so far may thus yield further insights on
the behavioural patterns among them. Specifically, the parameters of interest are
the elasticity of investment demand w.r.t. the real rate of interest and the
coefficient X indicating the presence or not of an external finance constraint.
Note that the coefficient on the tax rate is expected to be negative. However, as
we take an average profit tax rate over several years for each enterprise, the
limited variance in this data could make the coefficient insignificant. Following
this line of argument, a significant estimate of -82o2 is only expected if
discretionary taxation introduces large inter-firm variations in tax rates. Such
variation, indicative of a soft budget constraint (Kornai, 1986), is likely to be
higher in the less autonomous subsample. Equation 7) was estimated for four
enterprise subgroups: DAINV, DINV23, DINV2, and DINV3. The latter two
subgroups are components of the DINV23 group, DINV2 representing firms
where supervisory authorities alone make investment decisions, DINV3 standing
for all enterprises where decisions are made jointly. We also attempted
estimation by location but could not identify significant differences in the
parameters. This suggests that given autonomy even enterprises in Shanghai
would behave as profit maximisers.
As Table 14 reveals, groups DAINV and DINV3 (full or partial investment
autonomy) show very similar behavioural patterns. All estimated parameters
confirm with what would be expected under profit maximisation. The interest
rate elasticity is negative, its value being slightly below the output elasticity.
This confirms with results for Western economies (see Morris and Liu, 1994).
Pk
From the coefficient on ——(<52) and the coefficient on Fit_x{-82X), we can
deduct a value of X of -0.4662 for DAINV and -1.001 for DINV3, indicating a
very strong finance constraint. As expected, the cross-sectional variation in
average tax rates is too low to yield a significant estimate of -S2a2. By contrast,
subgroup DINV2 (no investment autonomy) show no significant reaction to
interest rates or relative prices. Interestingly, tax rates are a constraining factor
on investment demand, while -32X is insignificant. This implies that for DINV2
firms, retained earnings are not a preferred means of investment finance. Two
main explanations come to mind. On the one hand, in less autonomous firms30
Table 14 — Neo-Classical Investment Demand by Autonomy
a








































































retained earnings may be heavily taxed. On the other hand, access to bank credit
is ensured at preferential conditions due to the strong government involvement
in investment decisions. It is important to note that DINV2 firms represent a
minority in our sample, as can easily be seen from Table 6. Nonetheless, Table
14 indicates to what extent enterprise reforms have remained incomplete in
China. Just as some provinces so far still await to see the benefits of increased
autonomy, enterprises themselves will only adjust to price signals in China's
"socialist market economy" if given the chance to do so free of government
intervention.
V. Conclusions
This paper has reviewed the process of decentralisation since the onset of
economic reforms in China. Thereby, we have identified two opposing effects of
decentralisation on resource allocation and economic efficiency. Fiscal
decentralisation was shown to increase the incentives for provincial and local31
governments to maximise the tax returns from enterprises within their
jurisdiction and may thus lead to hardened budget constraints for SOEs.
Monetary decentralisation by contrast creates ample room for rent seeking by
local governments, particularly in the context of financial repression. Persistent
government intervention in credit markets via the credit plan exacerbates the
resulting inefficiencies in the allocation of investment funds and may counteract
the beneficial effects of local autonomy on the budget constraints of SOEs.
The policy conclusions that may be derived from this analysis are clear. The
central government would be well-advised to abandon its attempt to control
investment allocation through the credit plan as soon as possible. Apart from the
fact that this tool has become ineffective in controlling the rate of credit
expansion in the economy, it is also a major impediment in the improvement of
capital allocation at the enterprise level. Only if rents from directed credit at
negative real interest rates in the banking sector are abolished will local
governments be willing to delegate all responsibilities over investment to
enterprises. Our empirical findings show that this would greatly improve
investment allocation and is likely to raise productive efficiency. Moreover, it is
important to reckognise that the beneficial effects of autonomy on enterprise
behaviour are to a considerable extent conditioned by the degree of market
competition. The experience of Eastern European economies with
decentralisation during the 1980s suggests that if the market is dominated by a
few large industrial SOEs, autonomy alone does not induce the desired
behavioural changes. As China attempts to transfer the reform success from the
coastal provinces to the interior, it will have to implement a set of bankruptcy
regulations that provide for the exit of perpetual loss-makers. This would allow
the central government to relieve the banks from the provision of policy loans to
finance a quasi fiscal deficit and to sustain the current rapid growth of the
economy.32
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